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  The stunning events of 2007-2009 both shook the world and piqued interest in 
economics. In the 30-plus years that I have been teaching macro principles, I have never 
seen the level of interest in students as high as what I observed last year—rapt attention and 
no sleepers! Interest in economics has grown, and our students will want, expect, and 
deserve explanations of these events for years to come. This is truly a teaching moment, and 
that “moment” is going to be a long one. That’s the good news. The bad news is that the 
current curriculum fails to give students even imperfect answers. This means that the macro 
principles course will have to be changed. Although we can’t provide beginning students 
with complete answers, we can do a lot better than we have been doing.  
  My perspective in this paper is that of a textbook author and teacher of macro 
principles. The students in such courses are typically young, new to economics, unfamiliar 
with financial markets, and not well-equipped technically. This means, among other things, 
that we must simplify enormously, while keeping in mind Einstein’s famous dictum: 
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” Today’s textbooks and 
course syllabi were developed over decades that never witnessed anything remotely close to 
the events of 2007-2009. So many of the basic pedagogical decisions made over the years—
either tacitly or explicitly—need to be reconsidered. I start the paper with four such 
decisions, and then consider a list of seven new topics that one might want to add to a macro 
principles course. To give away part of the punch line at the outset, seven is too many. We 
must choose. 
Four Basic Pedagogical Decisions 
  My first major pedagogical choice is the relative degree of emphasis on growth 
versus business cycles. Of course, we need to cover both aspects of macro dynamics. But 
both textbook writers and teachers must decide how much time and effort to devote to each. 
I’ve been writing “Baumol and Blinder” for more than 30 years now,
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      Then, as the long boom of the 1980s progressed, fashions changed, and textbooks started 
to give more emphasis to long-run growth. This fad continued into the 1990s, as a brief and 
 and I have seen this 
choice run in fads. Prior to the 1980s, principles (and intermediate) texts focused strongly on 
business cycles. Indeed, macroeconomics was primarily the study of business cycles—
except at the graduate level. History, of course, suggests such an emphasis. Booms and busts, 
it turns out, swing elections and transform societies. When students came to learn 
macroeconomics, this is what they wanted to hear about. 
                                                 
1 William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy, 11
th Edition (Cengage: 2009). 
The first edition was published in 1979, and the publisher’s name has changed many times due to mergers, 
acquisitions, etc.     2 
mild recession early in the decade was followed by the longest expansion in U.S. history, 
which finally ended with what I call the “recessionette”—a recession so mild that it 
disappears in annual data. So growth became the rage and cycles were submerged. 
      The financial crisis and the ensuing mega-recession will predictably cause textbook 
writers and teachers to rethink that focus. Students will demand it, as will reality. I suspect 
we are now in the early stages of what will be a long-lasting and major “taste” change—
back toward more emphasis on business cycles. That is certainly what I think we should do.  
  A second, and related, decision that both textbook authors and instructors must make 
is how “Keynesian” to make their books/courses. This choice involves, e.g., whether to 
teach the Keynesian multiplier model, how much prominence to give to the consumption 
function, and so on. Books have changed considerably in their answers to such questions 
over the years. Indeed, some texts pretty much reject Keynesian analysis. I think it is pretty 
hard to explain most governments’ responses to the crisis and recession without a healthy 
dose of Keynes. 
  A third decision that textbook authors really must rethink is the “one-interest-rate” 
model. Almost all macro models are one-interest-rate models—not only in principles 
courses, but also in upper level courses. Indeed, I think it is fair to say that one-interest- rate 
models dominate macro teaching right through the graduate level. Economists, of course, 
have always known that reality involves many interest rates. There are huge scholarly 
literatures, for example, on term premiums and risk premiums. But when faced with the 
simplicity/complexity tradeoff, most of us decided that multiple interest rates were just not 
worth the complexity they added to the story we were telling. (Remember Einstein!) After 
all, we told students who asked, while there are many different interest rates, they all tend to 
rise and fall together. 
      I believe that assessment, which served us well for decades, has outlived its usefulness. 
Given what has transpired over the last few years, what in the world can possibly be meant 
by “the interest rate”? How can we explain events—events that were central to the financial 
crisis—in which Treasury yields fell while almost all other interest rates rose? In short, how 
can we continue to teach the one-interest-rate model? 
  My fourth and final major pedagogical decision is how complex the model must be, 
especially in the financial domain, in order to convey the appropriate story to our students. 
Complexity in the financial sector is almost completely absent from principles (and other 
macro) texts—left, I suppose, to more advanced courses in money and banking or finance. 
Keeping in mind the Einstein quotation mentioned earlier, this is one place where, in 
retrospect, we clearly erred on the side of excessive simplicity. To the extent that these texts     3 
have a “financial sector” at all,
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  As I prepare the next edition of Baumol and Blinder, I am struggling with how to 
answer each of these four questions, but especially the last. Fortunately, in my view, our 
book has always given cycles far more attention than growth, and it has maintained a 
Keynesian flavor for short-run (cyclical) analysis. I am quite comfortable with these 
decisions right now. But the one-interest-rate assumption has clearly lost touch with reality, 
and I am going to have to add some more material on finance. However, in adding such 
topics, I want to make sure that what I add is essential.  
 it is far too simple to convey even the essence of what 
happened—never mind the details. But once you start traveling down the complexity road in 
finance, where do you stop? Remember, these are principles students who may not even 
know how a bank account works! 
      Some might ask: Why not just add everything you need to explain recent events? After 
all, each professor can choose what to include and what to exclude in his or her own course. 
But that is not satisfactory for at least three reasons. The first is that, if something interesting 
appears in the text, there will be pressure on professors to use it—after all, students will see 
it there. The second reason is that textbook authors are supposed to provide guidance on 
what they think is important enough to consider teaching. But the third, most important, 
reason is that the principles course is already crammed with too much material. We 
economists, above all, should understand budget constraints, the necessity of choice, and the 
need to weigh costs (of inclusion) against benefits. Including “everything” is just not an 
option, even if we knew what it meant. 
New Topics for Macro Principles 
  In practice, every instructor must decide what new materials to add to his or her 
course—and what to delete, for the semester (or quarter) has not grown any longer. In this 
section of the paper, I discuss seven specific candidates for inclusion—all related to the 
financial crisis. But the problem is this: The full list is almost certainly too long. So I share 
my current thinking on what to include/exclude below.  
Risk Premiums in Interest Rates 
  As discussed above, all standard macro models have a single interest rate. In light of 
the recent financial crisis, this assumption simply won’t do any more. To tell the story of the 
recent crisis, it is surely necessary to have multiple interest rates. Our former excuse for 
pretending that there is only one interest rate—that all rates go up and down together—has 
been demonstrated to be false. To cite just one example, we just came through a period in 
which rates on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) soared while T-bill rates went to zero. So 
                                                 
2 Often, there is nothing more than demand and supply functions for money.     4 
I don’t think we can give that answer with a straight face any more—especially to principles 
students. (Graduate students will accept anything, as long as you tell them it is an 
assumption!) 
  The dimension of interest rates that I believe must be included involves an explicit 
understanding of how risk affects rates. It is not difficult to teach beginning students that 
every interest rate involves two components: the riskless (e.g., Treasury) rate plus a 
premium to cover the risk of default. Nor is it difficult to convey to students that higher 
likelihoods of default lead to higher risk premiums. But how much deeper to get into risk 
premiums is unclear. Explaining to students what determines the size of the risk premium is 
difficult, in part because we economists don’t have good explanations ourselves. The issue 
clearly involves the rational part: expected loss rates. But it also involves the potentially 
irrational part: bubbles and financial panics. That, for example, is where the animal spirits 
that Robert Shiller discusses in his paper in this symposium come in. At the level of the 
principles course, I am strongly inclined to leave risk premiums “exogenous”—that is, to 
include them, but not to get into detailed explanations of how they are determined.  
Asset-Market Bubbles 
  Currently, there is not much in the Baumol-Blinder textbook about bubbles. But, 
when teaching the course to Princeton students, I’ve often given a lecture on stock market 
bubbles. I found last year that this lecture is quite easy to adapt to housing bubbles. After all, 
the fundamentals of stock market valuation (dividends, expected growth rates, and discount 
rates) have precise analogs in the fundamentals of housing valuations (rental rates, expected 
growth rates, and discount rates). It seems pretty clear now that house prices went way 
beyond fundamentals before the crisis, and that the house price bubble subsequently burst. 
That discussion is relatively easy to get across to beginners; it can be included in the 
principles course without much problem.  
      The hard part is what, if anything, to say about what I call the “fixed income bubble,” 
which manifested itself (although the markets were saying no) in irrationally small risk 
premiums on almost every kind of debt. Interest rates that were “too low” meant, of course, 
that the corresponding bond prices were “too high,” although we didn’t know that for sure 
until the bubble burst. I think this part of the story is much harder to tell; and it gets harder 
and harder the more you cling to rational expectations. As some personal evidence for that, I 
can tell you that my many presentations on excessively small risk premiums, given to 
myriad audiences of financial-market participants from 2003 to 2006, had exactly zero effect 
on those premiums. 
Securitization     5 
  The securitization of mortgages, credit card debt, student loans, and many other 
forms of debt has always seemed like an excessive level of detail for a principles course. It 
is more than I want to teach or have the time to teach. But it is clearly part of the story of the 
financial crisis. So the question we have to ask ourselves now is whether we can tell the 
story without it. My current answer is: yes and no. By yes, I mean that we must at least 
discuss mortgage-backed securities (MBS), since they accounted for so much of the 
contagion of the problems in housing to a broader swath of the financial markets. By no, I 
mean that we can probably skip any broader discussion of securitization in the interest of 
simplicity. In fact, I would love to think of a way to get rid of MBS in the explanation. But I 
fear that it is not a detail, but rather a central part of the story.  
Leverage 
  Leverage is both central to the crisis and a good general lesson that is easy to teach. 
So I think the coverage of leverage should and will increase significantly. Speaking 
personally, there is no discussion of leverage at all in the 11
th Edition of our text, but there 
will be one in the next edition—displayed prominently.
3
Insolvency and Illiquidity 
 You really cannot explain what 
happened in the financial crisis without getting into leverage, and how it magnifies returns 
on both the upside and the downside. The good news about adding leverage as a topic is (a) 
that it is a valuable general lesson—something you’d like your students to know anyway, 
and (b) that it is quite easy to teach with numerical examples—you don’t need any formulas. 
In fact, I would argue that formulas inhibit rather than enhance understanding at this level.  
  A much harder concept that played a role in the crisis is the difference between 
insolvency, which means having negative net worth, and illiquidity, which means having too 
many assets that cannot easily be converted to cash. The distinction is important to how the 
crisis developed; but the issues here are subtle, perhaps too subtle for students taking the 
principles course. The problem is that while these two concepts are quite distinct 
conceptually, they blend together in practice. Indeed, we have seen how illiquidity can slide 
into and become (cause?) insolvency. So the distinction may be much less stark in practice 
than in theory. When a firm (or a household, for that matter) is illiquid, it can end up being 
forced into fire sales of assets, selling whatever it can at whatever price it can get. Such fire 
sales, in turn, can wreak havoc with supposed fundamental values and lead to insolvency. So 
here is one case where it may be appropriate to err on the side of simplicity and not cover 
illiquidity in the principles course. But an argument can certainly be made on the other side. 
Systemic Risk and Too Big To Fail 
                                                 
3 The 11
th Edition Update will be published shortly, with an entirely new chapter on the crisis. Leverage is 
taught in that chapter.     6 
  To my knowledge, neither of these topics is currently treated in most principles 
courses, although they do get treated later, especially in finance courses. Indeed, the whole 
focus on financial stability—what Raghuram Rajan, in his discussion in this symposium, 
called the underlying plumbing of the system—is pretty much absent from current texts. 
Instead, almost all the focus is on macroeconomic stability (reducing the variance of output 
and inflation). That is something that is going to have to change. We need more discussion 
of the nature and importance of financial stability, how it can be achieved, and what happens 
when it evaporates.  
  Once you include financial stability as, say, one of the goals of the central bank, 
systemic risk becomes a natural part of that discussion. Similarly, discussing systemic risk 
leads directly into “too big to fail” (TBTF) and its first cousin, “too interconnected to fail” 
(TITF)—the latter being the underlying rationale for saving firms such as Bear Stearns (and 
LTCM a decade earlier). Unfortunately, this is another topic that gets very deep very quickly, 
so it is tempting to try to teach around it. But can we? Issues surrounding TBTF and TITF 
are going to be central to the debate over financial reform and thus need to be discussed at 
least a bit. At least that is my current plan for the 12
th Edition of Baumol and Blinder. 
Moral Hazard 
  Any discussion of too big and too interconnected to fail will lead directly to a 
traditional micro subject: moral hazard. This is yet another topic that I think needs more 
attention in macro, even at the principles level. It will, as just noted, be a natural follow-up 
to any discussions of systemic risk and the government’s attempt to create a safety net under 
the financial plumbing. Fortunately, it can be taught in a reasonably simple way through 
examples.  
Conclusion 
  We really do need to change the textbook macro model—in principles and at higher 
levels as well. The model we have been teaching turns out to have been too simple, and it is 
going to have to be made a bit more complex. Part of the art of textbook writing is to add 
additional complexities without performing root and branch surgery, that is, to embed the 
necessary changes by trimming and planting around the edges of the basic textbook 
framework. Apart from the single-interest-rate assumption, that basic framework, in my 
view, remains solid, contrary to some of the views that Robert Shiller mentions in his paper 
in this symposium. I believe that, once the current framework is supplemented by some of 
the topics discussed above, it will provide a solid pedagogical approach to thinking about 
both what went wrong and the fiscal and monetary palliatives that were applied by 
governments. The trick, as Einstein appreciated, will be to find the minimal degree of 
additional complexity needed to provide students with the understanding they need and 
deserve. 